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COMMENTS
THE FEDERAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST ACT
OF 1984 AND THE 1985 AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA
ANTITRUST ACT: A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF
FLORIDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST
VULNERABILITY
KEITH C. HETRICK
IL INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court quashed the long-
standing presumption of local governmental immunity from fed-
eral antitrust laws.1 Municipalities became even more vulnerable to
antitrust suits in 1982 when the Court held, in Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder,2 that local government actions
under home rule powers were not state actions and, therefore, not
protected by the antitrust immunity specifically vested in the
states. Florida's municipalities, like those of Colorado, operate
under home rule powers. In Boulder, the Court found that state
imunity did not extend to local government action unless the ac-
tivity was "in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy."3
At the time of the Boulder decision, approximately thirty suits
were pending, but no monetary judgement had ever been assessed
against a municipality.4 Since Boulder, hundreds of antitrust ac-
tions have been filed against local governments across the country
with damage claims reaching into the billions of dollars.5 One star-
tling antitrust verdict against a small Chicago suburb resulted in a
$9.5 million award, which was trebled to $28.5 million.6
1. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 US. 389 (1978).
2. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
3. Id. at 52.
4. HousE ComM-rz ON THE JumcIARY, LEGSLATrV HISTORY OF LocAL GovmuNwzNT AN-
TrrRusT ACT oP 1984, HR REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 7, 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4608, 4611 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATV HISTORY].
5. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in Support of
Respondent, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985) (available March
15, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
6. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, No. 81 C-2745 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1984) (post trial
motions are pending in the trial court).
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During the 1983 session of the Florida legislature, the House
Committee on Community Affairs resolved to investigate the effect
of increasing antitrust vulnerability on Florida's local governments.
The magnitude of risk to which local governments were being ex-
posed in the performance of their traditional governmental func-
tions was largely unknown. State courts and lower federal courts
were in conflict as to which of two major interests should control
their decisions. The courts could give effect to a national policy, as
mandated by the antitrust laws, which seeks to further the public
interest by promoting competition. Alternatively, the courts could
endorse the conflicting interest of the municipality, a nonprofit
public institution that seeks to provide more efficient health, wel-
fare, and safety services by displacing competition with regulation.
Concern that treble damage suits might interfere with Florida's lo-
cal governmental officials in the performance of their jobs
prompted the House Committee on Community Affairs, in con-
junction with the Florida League of Cities and the State Associa-
tion of County Commissioners, to survey Florida's municipalities.
The survey was conducted to assess the effect that vulnerability to
antitrust scrutiny was having on the actions of Florida's
municipalities.
At the federal level, lobbying by local governments prompted
Congress to address this increasingly serious problem. The House
Judiciary Committee, identifying the treble damage remedy availa-
ble under the Clayton Act as a hajor incentive underlying civil
suits against local governments, drafted remedial legislation. On
October 24, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984 (the Act),7 which prohibited awards
of money damages against local governments in civil antitrust
actions.
The survey's impact has been diminished by the passage of the
federal Act. However, since the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980
closely tracks the federal Act in providing treble damages and in-
7. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36). For broader discussions of local governmental antitrust lia-
bility, see generally ANTrrrmusr mD LocAL Gov M~ENr (J. Siena ed. 1982); Michaelson &
Mernick, Antitrust Exposure of Local Governments-A Guide for the Chief Executive (pts.
1 & 2), FL& MUN. REc., Apr. 1983, at 2, May 1983, at 4; Page, After Boulder, 1982-83 CUR-
RENT Mtm. PROBS.; Freilich, Donovan & Rails, Antitrust Liability and Preemption of Au-
thority: Trends and Developments in Urban, State, and Local Government Law, 15 URs.
LAw. 705 (Fall 1983); Carlisle, Harris, Skitol & Mardikes, Governmental Liability for Fed-
eral Statutory Torts: A Search for Precedent, 15 URs. LAw. 817 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Carlisle].
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junctive relief in suits filed in state courts, the survey remains rele-
vant and provides valuable insight into concerns of local govern-
mental officials over their increasing exposure to antitrust suits.
This Comment summarizes the evolution of local governmental
antitrust liability which led to the enactment of the federal Act. It
then discusses a survey of antitrust concerns of Florida's local gov-
ernmental officials. Finally, the Comment discusses the recent fed-
eral Act and concludes with a discussion of the recent amendments
to the Florida Antitrust Act of 19808 and the need for other states
to consider amending their state antitrust laws to protect local
governments from antitrust liability.
II. THE COMMON LAW EvOLUTION OF LocAL GOVERNMENTAL
ANTITRUST LIABImY
The federal antitrust statutes which have been of primary signif-
icance to local governments are the Sherman Act9 and the Clayton
Act.10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract,
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade. . . ."12 Since
all contracts can be said to restrain trade, the courts read into the
statute the word "unreasonable" after the word "every." 12 Section
1 has been read to prohibit tying arrangements in services, in-
tangibles, and real property. Section 2 does not outlaw monopolies
as such, but does prohibit monopolizations, combinations, conspir-
acies or attempts to monopolize' s in interstate or foreign com-
merce. The offense of monopolization under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power
in a relevant market, and (2) a deliberate act to acquire or main-
tain that power. 4 Monopoly power is the power to control prices
and exclude competitors in the "relevant market." The relevant
8. Fla. HB 369 (1985) (amending FLA. STAT. § 542.17 (1983), creating FLA. STAT. §
542.235). The survey portion of this report was initially promulgated in 1984 by the Florida
House of Representatives, House Committee on Community Affairs, Sidney Martin, Chair-
man. The author expresses his gratitude to the Committee on Community Affairs, the Flor-
ida League of Cities, and the State Association of County Commissioners for their permis-
sion to use the survey data in this Comment.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
12. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 US. 1, 59-62 (1911); see also National Soc'y
of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Arus'r AND LocAL Govmur,
supra note 7, at 10, 105.
13. 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies § 34 (1971).
14. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.S. § 2 n.33 (Law. Co-op. 1975).
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market is defined by both the geographic area in which competi-
tors engage in business and the specificity of consumer demand for
a particular product.15 For example, the granting of an exclusive
cable television franchise by a city may be attacked as a section 2
violation. An antitrust violation can result in severe penalties, in-
cluding criminal sanctions, injunctions, payments of treble dam-
ages, payment of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, and payment of the
cost of the law suit.16
The Clayton Act applies to persons engaged in commerce. It pro-
hibits specific acts, including price discrimination, tying arrange-
ments in commodities, exclusive dealing arrangements, require-
ments contracts, and mergers, that substantially foreclose
competition. Price discrimination refers to the sale of goods at dif-
ferent prices to similarly situated buyers. In a tying arrangement,
the availability of one product or service is conditioned on the
purchase of another. For example, a buyer may be required by the
seller to purchase product B, which he may not want, in order to
obtain product A, which he does want. Exclusive dealing contracts
are arrangements in which the retailer agrees to stop dealing with
the manufacturer's competitors, depriving consumers of the oppor-
tunity to purchase the competitor's goods.17
The concept of governmental antitrust immunity is a product of
judicial evolution. Neither the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, nor
the Clayton Act of 1914 expressly applies to state or local govern-
ments. It was generally presumed by the courts that the "purpose
of the federal antitrust laws . . .was to prevent anticompetitive
conduct by and among private parties," and that state govern-
ments "were not'subject to those laws."18
The presumption of state immunity was tested in the landmark
case of Parker v. Brown.29 Parker involved a suit by a raisin pro-
ducer against the State of California and its Director of Agricul-
ture for alleged Sherman Act violations. 0 The state legislature,
through the California Agriculture Prorate Act of 1933, had au-
15. 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies §§ 35-37 (1971); see also 15 U.S.C.S. § 2 nn.30 & 45-53
(Law. Co-op. 1975).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 8, 13a, 15 (1982); see also ANTrruST LocAL GoVERNMENT supra
note 7, at 38, 62.
17. C. Coffey, Potential Antitrust Liability of Florida Municipalities When Franchising
9-10 (May 19, 1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
18. Michaelson & Mernick (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 8.
19. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
20. Id. at 349.
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thorized the establishment of agricultural marketing programs to
conserve the agricultural wealth of the state.21 The Director was
authorized to establish a seasonal proration marketing program for
raisins in order to reduce competition and stabilize prices. The
United States Supreme Court held that regulation of the handling,
disposition, and pricing of raisins by a state was not within the
intended scope of the Sherman Act and not a violation thereof.22
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority, stated:
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, im-
posed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit.2
The Court in Parker reasoned that, under our dual system of gov-
ernment, the power to regulate interstate commerce has been dele-
gated to the Congress. Therefore, any state regulation of commerce
may be preempted by congressional intent to regulate. Further, the
court found that the Sherman Act makes no mention of the states
as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state
action or official action directed by a state. "The Act is applicable
to 'persons' including corporations ... "24 The Parker decision
was the genesis of the "state action" exemption.
The state action exemption was narrowed in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar 5 with the establishment of a "compulsion" test.
Goldfarb involved a county bar association that had established a
base fee schedule for attorneys' charges to clients. The fee schedule
was enforced by the state bar association. The United States Su-
preme Court found that the association was not accorded Parker
state action immunity from the Sherman Act because its actions
were not compelled by the state supreme court or by the state it-
self.26 Under the rule of Goldfarb, shelter from the purview of anti-
trust laws is granted only in the face of affirmative state action or
in local activity that is mandated by the state. Notably, this case
involved a quasi-state agency acting in a private competitive
scheme.
21. Id. at 344-348.
22. Id. at 350.
23. Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 351 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7).
25. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26. Id. at 791.
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Two years after Goldfarb, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
compulsion test in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.27 Distinguishing
Goldfarb on its facts, the Court in Bates found that the state bar
association, in prohibiting the plaintiff's advertisement of legal ser-
vices, acted pursuant to an Arizona Supreme Court disciplinary
rule.28 The majority held that the state supreme court's discipli-
nary rule reflected a "clear[ly] articulat[ed] . . . and affirmatively
expressed" state policy that regulated professional behavior. 2' The
Court in Bates thus announced the standard under which the state
action exemption is currently evaluated.
The next major development in the common law evolved in re-
sponse to the question whether state subdivisions were also subject
to federal antitrust laws. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 30 the Court reviewed practices of utility companies
owned by several municipalities and operated in competition with
private utility companies. The municipalities conditioned the pro-
vision of gas and water services to customers outside their city lim-
its on the purchase of electricity from the cities. The private utili-
ties claimed that this was an illegal tying arrangement. The city, as
a subdivision of the state, claimed state immunity under the
Parker doctrine. In holding that city-owned utilities did not enjoy
"state action" immunity from the antitrust laws, the Supreme
Court stated that in order for a city to claim the state immunity, it
must act pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy.31
Three observations can be drawn from the Lafayette decision.
First, a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state pol-
27. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
28. Id. at 359.
29. Id. at 362. The notion of active state supervision was also mentioned in this case, but
it generally did not become an issue for local governments until the Court's decision in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
30. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Lafayette litigation ironically was commenced in federal
district court by several Louisiana municipalities which alleged that Louisiana Power &
Light Co. and others had engaged in predatory practices and had in other ways violated the
federal antitrust laws. Louisiana Power & Light Co. counterclaimed, alleging that the plain-
tiff municipalities had engaged in antitrust violations. The counterclaim was dismissed on
motion by the plaintiffs. On appeal, the counterclaim dismissal was reversed by the Fifth
Circuit. 532 F.2d 431 (1976). The key question presented to the Supreme Court was whether
Louisiana Power & Light Co.'s counterclaim had been properly dismissed. In affrming the
Fifth Circuit's holding and resurrecting Louisiana Power & Light Co.'s counterclaim, a plu-
rality of the Court (Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) took the view that the
federal antitrust laws were applicable to local governments unless "the state authorized or
directed a given municipality to act as it did." 435 U.S. at 414.
31. 435 U.S. at 410.
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icy allows a municipality to act as an instrument of the state; thus,
not all municipal anticompetitive activities are subject to antitrust
restraint.3 2 Second, a plurality of the Court determined that the
expression "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state
policy does not require specific, detailed legislative authority;
rather, "an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities
of cities and other subordinate governmental units exists when it is
found . . . 'that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of.'- 3 Third, in a separate concurrence, Chief Justice
Burger drew a distinction between local governmental activities
which are by their nature proprietary (i.e., characteristic of a busi-
ness), and those which are traditionally governmental. He charac-
terized the generation of electrical energy by local government op-
erated utility companies in competition with private utilities as a
proprietary or profit making venture, rather than a traditional gov-
ernmental function.3 Chief Justice Burger's distinction between
traditional and proprietary activities35 was later abandoned by the
Court in Boulder. The issues litigated today in the area of local
governmental antitrust liability arise from the different interpreta-
tions given the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
state policy standard. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,38 the Supreme Court further re-
fined the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" stan-
dard by requiring that the state be involved in active supervision
of the anticompetitive program. The Court reviewed a California
statute that required wine producers and wholesalers to submit
price schedules to a state agency. The statute also prohibited sales
to retailers at prices other than those set in the price schedules. In
refusing to apply state action immunity to the state agency, the
Court found that the statute merely authorized price setting and
enforced the prices established by private parties, and did not es-
tablish prices, review the reasonableness of the price schedules, or
regulate the terms of fair trade contracts.38 Midcal teaches that a
state does not confer antitrust immunity to those who violate the
32. Id. at 413.
33. Id. at 415 (footnote omitted) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
34. Id. at 424 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 422-24.
36. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
37. Id. at 105.
38. Id. at 103.
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Sherman Act when it merely authorizes an activity by statute or
declares the activity to be lawful. It should be noted that the chal-
lenged practice of regulating wine pricing was characterized by the
Court as "essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."39 The
Midcal opinion implies that the "active supervision" test may be
necessary only when dealing with private parties to an anticompe-
titive scheme. An examination of lower court decisions concerning
local governmental antitrust liability reveals that active state su-
pervision has not been a prerequisite to a finding of state action
immunity.'0
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder."1 Plaintiff cable television operator
had informed the city that it was planning to expand its business
into other areas of the city. The city, after having received an offer
from another company newly formed to provide cable service, and
after having reviewed its cable television policy, adopted an ordi-
nance which prohibited Community Communications Company
from expanding its business into other areas of the city for a pe-
riod of three months. The City Council's purpose for the morato-
rium was to allow itself the time necessary to draft a cable televi-
sion ordinance which would provide new businesses the
opportunity to enter the Boulder market before Community Com-
munication Company preempted potential competitors. The ex-
isting cable television franchisee sued the city, claiming violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Since the City of Boulder operated under a state constitutional
grant of "home rule" authority,' the question presented to the Su-
preme Court was whether the city's home rule powers, under which
39. Id. at 106.
40. Freilich, Donovan & Ralls, supra note 7, at 710 (citing Gold Cross Ambulance &
Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1013 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1864 (1985); Central Iowa Refuse Syss., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency,
557 F. Supp. 131, 136 (S.D. Iowa 1982)).
41. 445 U.S. 40 (1982).
42. Home rule is the power vested in a local unit of government to manage its own af-
fairs. Under home rule, which is required or permitted by a state constitution or granted by
a state legislative body without specific constitutional authorization, the voters may choose
a commission to draft a charter (which broadly defines the local government's powers),
which is approved or rejected by the voters. This ability of voters to control the charter
process is contrasted with the granting of charters by the legislature under special acts,
general laws, or option plans. Home rule limits legislative interference in local affairs by
granting localities control over their own problems and by eliminating the need for localities
to continually revisit the legislature about local policy changes, provided the local govern-
ments do not violate the constitution or general laws of the state.
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the moratorium ordinance was justified, were sufficient to consti-
tute "state action" and thereby qualify the City Council's action
for exemption from Sherman Act liability. The Supreme Court, re-
affirming the test of Lafayette, announced that in order for a city
to claim the state immunity, the municipal action must be "in fur-
therance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy. . . ." The Court reasoned that despite its
constitutional home rule power, the city was not itself a sovereign
entity entitled to antitrust immunity. The grant of home rule au-
thority to local governments was neutral with respect to conduct of
a city and, therefore, was not sufficient to extend the state action
immunity to Colorado's municipalities. The Court said that the
state must have at least "contemplated" the specific action the
municipality intended to take.4" The Court stated that the general
grant of power by a state to a local government to enact ordinances
does not necessarily imply state authority to enact specific an-
ticompetitive ordinances. 4' The decision suggests that the nature
of the municipality's challenged conduct, whether governmental or
proprietary, does not affect antitrust immunity, contrary to what
the Court had suggested in Lafayette, just four years earlier.'6 The
question of how much state supervision of municipal activities is
necessary to protect municipalities from antitrust attack was left
unanswered. 47
Prior to the Seventh Circuit's holding in Town of Hallie v. City
43. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id.
46. Id. at n.18.
47. In explaining its standard of "clearly articulated and affrmatively expressed" state
policy, the Court in Boulder noted that the state's position must not be one of mere neutral-
ity with respect to municipal actions. While a state need not compel the anticompetitive
practice, the state must have authorized or at least contemplated the conduct. 455 U.S. at
55. Lower courts have increasingly demonstrated a willingness to liberally infer state super-
vision or authorization. The most forceful articulation of this position by lower courts was
presented in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1983), afld,
105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), where the inquiry was not whether the municipal anticompetitive
activity was contemplated by the legislature, but whether that activity was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of an authorized activity. See also Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v.
City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982) (where the court inferred immunity from a
state statute), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983). Other jurisdictions also have liberally con-
strued the term "contemplated." See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of
Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1013 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Jonnet
Dev. Corp. v. Caliguiri, 558 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Capital TeL Co. v. City of Sche-
nectady, 560 F. Supp. 207 (N.DN.Y. 1983); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennroyal
Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
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of Eau Claire,48 the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pueblo Aircraft
Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo49 was perhaps the most liberal inter-
pretation of the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
state policy standard. The city owned certain facilities and land on
which an airport was constructed. For many years the city had
granted leases to "fixed-based operators ' 50 who carried on busi-
nesses on specific portions of leased airport lands and performed
specific services which were monitored by the city. Several months
prior to the expiration of Pueblo Aircraft's lease, the city decided
to require public bidding for new leases. There were two bidders,
Pueblo Aircraft and the Pan-Ark Corporation. Pan-Ark was the
successful bidder. Pueblo Aircraft subsequently filed suit against
the city and Pan-Ark alleging violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 14 of the Clayton Act. Pueblo Aircraft argued that
the city's grant of an exclusive franchise with operating rights had
the effect of restraining trade, substantially lessening competition,
and creating a monopoly in the line of commerce." Upholding the
district court's finding of state action exemption, the Tenth Circuit
cited a state statute that authorized the city to acquire lands and
to regulate the privileges associated with airport operations. The
Court of Appeals noted that, after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lafayette,
[I]n order to find that a subordinate state governmental body is
exempt from the operation of federal antitrust laws it must be
found that the state legislature contemplated certain type of an-
ticompetitive restraint in authorizing the subordinate body to
perform and engage in certain activity.... [I]t is not necessary
to point to express statutory mandate for each act that is al-
leged to violate the antitrust laws .... [I]t will suffice if the ac-
tivity and issue is found to be clearly within legislative intent. 2
The state statute in Pueblo arguably is not specific and is as
neutral with respect to authorizing anticompetitive conduct as the
48. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
49. 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983).
50. Id. at 806. A fixed base operation is one that requires the operator who enters into a
lease agreement with the local government to provide specific facilities, services, equipment,
and personnel to meet the requirements for certain operations of an airport used by aircraft,
passengers, crews, and freight shippers. In most cases, the leases include those portions of
the airport premises with hangars and other improvements thereon where the services are
performed and the supplies stored.
51. Id. at 805 nn. 1-2.
52. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
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constitutional grant of "home rule" authority relied upon by the
City of Boulder in displacing competition. In addition, the court in
Pueblo, interpreting the 1978 Lafayette decision, seemed to give
little weight to the "active state supervision" requirement enunci-
ated in the 1980 Midcal decision. The United States Supreme
Court, in denying certioriari in Pueblo, let pass the opportunity to
clarify its standard of "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy and left unresolved the question whether and
to what extent active state supervision would be required of state
legislation designed to immunize local governments from federal
antitrust liability.
At issue in Town of Hattie v. City of Eau Claire" was how ex-
plicitly a state policy must be articulated under the state action
exemption doctrine, and whether active state supervision is in fact
necessary." In affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court
resolved that active state supervision is not required for a finding
of municipal antitrust immunity.5 5 The Hallie decision supports
the growing trend among lower courts to infer state action immu-
* nity for municipalities based upon state legislation that implicitly
condones the anticompetitive conduct. 6
The dispute in Hallie arose when townships adjacent to the City
of Eau Claire sought access to the city-operated sewage treatment
facility. The city, which operated the area's only treatment facil-
ity,5 would not accept sewage collected and transported by the
towns." The city provided combined collection, transportation,
and treatment services for sewage to outlying landowners who
agreed to annexation by the city." The townships brought suit,
claiming that the city was using its monopoly over sewage treat-
ment to gain a monopoly in sewage collection and transportation,
and that the conditioning of treatment upon collection and trans-
53. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct 1713 (1985), af'g 700 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1983).
54. Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1717.
55. Id. at 1720.
56. Carlisle, supra note 7, at 843-45.
57. Hallie, 700 F.2d at 378. "The city used federal funds to build a sewage treatment
facility within the city limits, and this sewage treatment facility is the only such facility in
the market available to the Towns." Id. This resulted in a monopoly for the city in the
market for sewage treatment.
58. "The disposal of sewage is a three-step process. Sewage must be collected from the
user, transported to the treatment facility, and treated and disposed of by the treatment
facility. The City's monopoly in this case extends only to the third step." Id. at n.1.
59. Id.
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portation constituted an illegal tying arrangement.6 0
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court and rejected the
plaintiffs townships' interpretation of Boulder."' The townships ar-
gued that the city's anticompetitive conduct could derive state ac-
tion immunity only if authorized by specific state legislation.
Refering to Wisconsin statutes that allowed cities to fix the areas
in which to extend sewage services and to condition the extension
of a sewage system on annexation, 2 the Seventh Circuit stated: "If
the state authorizes certain conduct, we can infer that it condones
the anticompetitive effect that is a reasonable or foreseeable conse-
quence of engaging in the authorized activity."6 3 Judge Wisdom,
writing for a unanimous panel, also concluded that a municipality's
immunity under Parker is not contingent upon state compulsion of
the anticompetitive activity required by Goldfarb. He emphasized
that Boulder and Lafayette required only that a state authorize
the municipality's activity. This could be done by any state policy
which "evidences an intent of the legislature to displace competi-
tion with regulation-whether compelled, directed, authorized, or
in the form of a prohibition. . . ."" Finally, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Midcal requirement of active state supervision was
limited to private parties and did not apply to a city in its per-
formance of a traditional governmental function such as sewage
treatment.65
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding and reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit.66 The Court distinguished Boulder in that Colo-
rado's Home Rule Amendment conveyed only the most general au-
thority to municipalities to govern local affairs rather than specific
authority to displace competition in areas such as cable televi-
sion.6 7 The Supreme Court justified distinguishing a municipality
from a private party by establishing presumptions that private
60. Id.
61. Id. at 381.
62. Id. at 382 & ni. 13-14.
63. 700 F.2d. at 381.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 384. The Seventh Circuit expressly reserved the question "[w]hether a munici-
pality undertaking anticompetitive activity that falls outside the scope of a traditional gov-
ernmental function must be actively supervised by the state to receive Parker v. Brown
immunity." Id. at n.18. See also Hallie, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1720 (Court held that no require-
ment of active state supervision is imposed on municipalities); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (Court eliminated distinction between traditional and
other governmental functions in the context of the commerce clause).
66. Halie, 105 S. Ct. at 1716.
67. Id. at 1720.
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parties act in their own behalf, whereas municipalities, as creatures
of the states, act in the interest of the public.6e The Court also
found that the requirement of state compulsion or direct state in-
volvement is not necessary to a finding that a municipality acted
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy.6 9 The Court con-
cluded that active state supervision is not necessary to achieve mu-
nicipal immunity, but may be used as evidence of a clear articula-
tion of state policy. 0  Although the Court distinguished
municipalities from private parties, it seemed to disregard any dis-
tinction between traditional and proprietary governmental
functions.7 2
Summary
The recent passage of federal legislation which eliminates the
remedy of damages for antitrust violations by local governments
under the federal antitrust laws leaves intact the threat of injunc-
tions, expensive antitrust litigation, and the potential for invalida-
tion of governmental acts. But the Hallie decision may make it
easier for local governments to avoid injunctive remedies. A local
government may be able to demonstrate that the anticompetitive
effect of a certain activity, authorized by state statute, is a reason-
able or foreseeable consequence of a local government's engaging in
that activity. The activity is thus supported by a clear articulation
and affirmative expression of state policy, and is exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. At the very least, the clarification of stan-
dards and the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in Hallie
indicate a retreat from Boulder,2 and make the Hallie decision the
most important Supreme Court interpretation of local governmen-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1720-21.
71. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). This
decision, concerning the applicability of federal minimum wage and hour laws to a metro-
politan transit authority, overruled National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 US. 833 (1976).
The Court in National League of Cities had held that the Commerce Clause does not em-
power Congress to enforce such requirements against the states "in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions." Id. at 852. In overruling National League of Cities, the Supreme
Court held that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms
of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with estab-
lished principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which
National League of Cities purported to rest." Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007. Thus, the Supreme
Court will no longer rely on a distinction between traditional and proprietary activities of a
local government.
72. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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tal antitrust liability since Boulder.
The current test for local governmental immunity from federal
antitrust liability is whether action by the local government or its
officials is conducted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirm-
atively expressed" state policy favoring substitution of anticompe-
titive conduct for free competition. 3 Such a policy need only be
evinced by a state statute that authorizes the provision of services
and implicitly anticipates that anticompetitive conduct is a fore-
seeable result of the local government's action.7" Active state su-
pervision is not necessary. This test applies to traditional govern-
mental as well as proprietary functions.
Prior to the Hallie decision, the lower federal courts issued di-
verse interpretations of the Boulder standard. In Hallie, the Su-
preme Court clarified its position on municipal antitrust liability.
Perhaps the passage of the recent federal Act impressed upon the
Court that there was indeed a viable federal interest in protecting
local governments' ability to govern in the public interest. Whether
the states themselves will make adjustments in state antitrust laws
in order to protect local governments remains to be seen.
IMI SuRVEY OF FLORIDA'S LocAL GOVERNMENTS
A. Introduction
In January, 1984, the Florida House Committee on Community
Affairs sent local governments an antitrust questionnaire. The
Committee sought to identify problems and to discover the percep-
tions of antitrust liability shared by attorneys and managers of
Florida's local governments. The issue has been a major topic of
discussion among many local governmental interest groups and
state legislators around the country since 1982. It must be
remembered that the survey was issued, and the results recorded,
prior to the October 1984 enactment of the federal Act and prior to
the May 1985 amendments to the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980.
B. County and Municipal Responses
1. Population of Jurisdictions and Persons Responding to the
Survey.
73. Id. at 52 & n.14.
74. Hallie, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
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Of Florida's 391 charter municipalities, 125, or 32%, responded
to the survey. Of Florida's 67 counties, 25, or 37%, responded to
the survey. Although not statistically significant, this response rate
is above average for municipalities and provides a fair indication of
local government opinion. Responses to the survey came from a
geographic cross section of Florida local governments, representing
local governments with populations ranging from less than 10,000
to greater than 150,000. All responses are considered valuable be-
cause any jurisdiction, regardless of size, is capable of violating the
antitrust laws. The original survey data is on file with the Florida
House of Representatives, House Committee on Community Af-
fairs. This Comment does not cite to the survey itself, for it is in-
tended that this report should serve as the primary source for
presentation of the survey questions and response data.
The survey was directed to Florida's city and county administra-
tors and attorneys."7 For convenience, responses are attributed to
the local governmental entity and not to the particular local official
who responded to the survey.
2. What problems, if any, has Boulder created in terms of legal
advice given to elected officials, or to what extent has Boulder
had an effect on the decision making process?
This question was designed to discover what effects the increas-
ing exposure to antitrust liability was having on day-to-day advice
given by city managers and city attorneys to elected officials re-
garding the provision of services. Of the counties responding to the
survey, 68% replied that no problems had arisen because of Boul-
der. The Boulder decision seemed to signal local officials that they
needed to consider the potential for antitrust law violations. The
responses from the miniority of eight counties are discussed below.
Broward County stated that the Boulder decision had an impact
on legal advice given with respect to exclusive taxi and limousine
franchises at the Broward County operated airport. Charlotte
County mentioned that, on the advice of counsel, the Board of
County Commissioners postponed extending exclusive garbage
hauling franchises. Desoto County reported that, because of Boul-
der, grants of solid waste disposal and cable television franchises
75. For counties, 20% of the responses came from county managers or administrators,
55% came from county attorneys, and 25% came from other persons. For cities, 50% of the
responses came from city managers, 30% came from city attorneys, 20% came from other
persons.
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had been delayed for extensive review. Hillsborough County noted
that Boulder and other related decisions were specifically consid-
ered in developing the resource recovery project of Hillsborough
County in 1983. In accordance with Boulder the Florida legislature
enacted special legislation which established a solid waste disposal
and resource recovery system within the territorial boundaries of
Hillsborough County.76 Lee County replied that Boulder had in-
spired a continuing review and update of the bidding process and
franchise agreements. Volusia County observed problems caused
by Boulder in the area of cable television and non-emergency need
transportation services. Leon County noted that Boulder has
caused exclusive franchises to be granted with caution.
St. Lucie County informed the House Community Affairs Com-
mittee that provision of centralized water and sewer services had
been delayed due to a perceived need for special legislation that
would eliminate antitrust problems by specifically authorizing the
county to take certain action. For example, the county had re-
quested special state legislation providing for the creation of water
and sewer districts and authorizing mandatory line connections.
St. Lucie County viewed mandatory connections as necessary to
establish the new system's financial feasibility and saw special
state legislation as a vehicle to avoid antitrust liability. The county
also mentioned that it is reviewing its purchasing guidelines.
Of the 125 municipalities that responded, 70% reported that the
Boulder decision had had no adverse impact on the local decision
making process. Five cities identified some adverse impact on the
decision making process regarding grants of exclusive cable televi-
sion franchises. Three cities indicated some problems regarding
grants of exclusive franchises in the areas of solid waste disposal
and garbage collection franchises. Cocoa Beach stated that it no
longer uses exclusive franchises. Prior to Boulder, Cocoa Beach
had permitted only two taxi businesses. After Boulder, the city
abandoned the limit. The City of Gulf Port also expressed hesi-
tancy to grant exclusive franchises in light of the Boulder decision.
Eighteen municipalities indicated other areas in which the Boul-
der decision had impinged upon the local decision making process.
Daytona Beach, for example, related that it was forced to bid out a
stadium concession agreement that had traditionally been reserved
to a band parent association. The city also revealed that it had
76. The Hillsborough County Solid Waste Disposal and Resource Recovery Act of 1983,
ch. 83-415, 1983 FIa. Laws 166.
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awarded bench contracts exclusively to the Jaycees against the ad-
vice of counsel. The city noted that antitrust litigation exposure
adversely affects the local governmental decision making process.
The antitrust laws should not apply to local governments. Unlike
the private sector, a corporate entity can take into consideration
its potential profit in evaluating the antitrust laws. Local govern-
ments, on the other hand, do not base their decisions on potential
profit.
Finally, nine municipalities indicated adverse impacts of Boul-
der on the local decision making process in more than one area,
including grants of cable television and solid waste disposal
franchises. 77 Of all the cities that indicated problems in the deci-
sion making process, six cities had recently retained outside anti-
trust counseF 8 and nine cities anticipated a need to retain outside
antitrust counsel.79
3. What types of services or decision areas do you see as most
likely to expose your city or county to antitrust litigation?
The survey format, reproduced below, permitted local govern-
ments to select, without ranking, one or more categories from a list
of services, with all responses given equal weight. The data pro-
vided below compiles the responses of 25 counties and 125
municipalities.
Counties
(1) Cable television (56%)
(2) Solid waste and disposal franchises (56%)
(3) Utility operations (20%)
(4) Land use and zoning (52%)
(5) Hospital ambulance services (52%)
(6) Construction of water and sewer systems (12%)
(7) Airport services and concessions (16%)
(8) Mass transit and public transportation (8%)
(9) Awards of contracts (20%)
(10) Other (0%)
Municipalities
(1) Cable television (64%)
77. Cape Canaveral, Clearwater, Daytona Beach Shores, Fort Pierce, Gulf Breeze, Mar-
gate, North Miami Beach, Winter Haven, and Winter Park.
7& Dade City, Eustis, Margate, Panama City Beach, Pensacola, and Temple Terrace.
79. Dade City, Daytona Beach, Delray Beach, Fort Meyers, Gainesville, North Miami
Beach, Palm Bay, Pensacola, and Temple Terrace.
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(2) Solid waste and disposal franchises (52%)
(3) Utility operations (35%)
(4) Land use and zoning (49%)
(5) Hospital ambulance services (5%)
(6) Construction of water and sewer systems (28%)
(7) Airport services and concessions (8%)
(8) Mass transit and public transportation (5%)
(9) Awards of contracts (38%)
(10) Other (8%)
The responses of counties and municipalities were similar. Local
regulation of cable television, solid waste and disposal, and land
use and zoning were perceived as the service areas most vulnerable
to antitrust litigation. This is perhaps because actions taken in
these service areas characteristically involve exclusive contracts or
regulations restricting competition.
4. What services to citizens, if any, have been avoided to escape
potential litigation that antitrust lawsuits bring?
All but two counties responding to the survey indicated that no
services had been avoided due to fear of potential antitrust litiga-
tion. Lee County reported that awards and regulation of exclusive
cable television franchises had been avoided as a result of potential
antitrust litigation. St. Lucie County reported that efforts to pro-
vide centralized sewer and water services had been slowed signifi-
cantly to avoid potential antitrust litigation.
Although a majority of municipalities reported no avoidance of
services attributable to potential antitrust litigation, eight cities re-
sponded otherwise. Cocoa Beach no longer grants exclusive taxi
cab franchises. Daytona Beach Shores avoids city-controlled gar-
bage collection. Daytona Beach mentioned that, in many instances,
it felt compelled to award to the low bidder over a preferred com-
petitor. Deland refused to award an exclusive franchise to a fixed-
base operator at the Deland airport. The City of Eustis had consid-
ered building and operating its own cable vision system, patterned
after that of Valparaiso, Florida, but the possibility of antitrust
actions resulted in a decision to award a non-exclusive franchise to
a private firm. Ft. Pierce has delayed action pertaining to the de-
livery of unspecified services while studying possible antitrust
problems. North Miami has avoided exclusive commercial garbage
collection franchises. Likewise, in Palm Beach, efforts to pursue a
change in a franchise agreement with Southern Bell have been
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hindered.
5. Does your city or county engage in any of the following prac-
tices: (1) award exclusive franchises; (2) set rates; (3) engage in
territorial or market allocation (for example, when a city or
county is divided among several cable operators with each given
exclusive rights to an area); (4) maintain any agreements which
permit a franchisee to condition the availability of one product
on the purchase of another (for example, an agreement between
a city and a cable company to condition the availability of pre-
mium services such as HBO on the purchase of basic: services)?
It is useful here to review the types of antitrust challenges that
municipalities or counties may face. If a locality awards exclusive
franchises, it may be accused of conspiring to monopolize. A local-
ity that sets rates may be accused of price fixing, which is consid-
ered a per se illegal restraint of trade.8 0 If a locality engages in
territorial or market allocation, it may be accused of dividing mar-
kets. If the availability of one product or service is conditioned on
the purchase of another, an illegal tying arrangement may be al-
leged. If a municipality decides to run its own services and exclude
competitors, it may also be accused of monopolizing. Seventy per-
cent of the 25 counties and 83% of the 125 municipalities that re-
sponded indicated they may be susceptible to some form of anti-
trust challenge.81
80. See ANTmRusT AND LocAL GOvmNMENT, supra note 7, at 10, 28.
81. The following is a statistical report of those localities which engage in the indicated
practices. A locality may have checked more than one response.
Counties
(1) Award exclusive franchises (48%)
(2) Set rates (52%)
(3) Territorial or market allocation (28%)
(4) Conditional franchise agreements (24%)
Of the 25 counties that responded, 8 did not engage in any of the above practices. Nearly
60% of those 17 counties that engaged in the above practices participated in two or more of
the above practices, and nearly 30% engaged in all of the above practices.
Municipalities
(1) Award exclusive franchises (62%)
(2) Set rates (62%)
(3) Territorial or market allocation (9%)
(4) Conditional franchise agreements (29%)
Of the 125 municipalities that responded, 21 engaged in none of the indicated practices,
and 68 engaged in two or more of the indicated practices. Only one city engaged in all of the
above practices.
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6. Is outside antitrust counsel presently retained; has antitrust
counsel recently been retained; is outside antitrust counsel ex-
pected to be retained in the future?
Of the cities responding to the survey, 5% reported a recent re-
tainer of antitrust counsel 2 and 10% anticipated retaining outside
counsel in the near future.83 Nearly 85% of all counties responding
to the survey denied any involvement with outside antitrust coun-
sel. Only Broward County reported a recent retainer. Charlotte
County anticipated having to retain outside antitrust counsel in
the near future.
Broward County was involved in a suit that had been filed by an
off-airport car rental company that wanted to install direct tele-
phone lines in the airport terminal. The county's denial of the re-
quest was based primarily upon its concession agreements with
four on-airport car rental companies. The county reported a one
time defense cost of $10,000.
Charlotte County anticipated having to retain outside antitrust
counsel at an estimated annual cost of $10,000 to defend the
county's mandatory garbage disposal system. In 1975 the county
was faced with a garbage problem when an area about forty miles
from the county's single sanitary landfill became littered with gar-
bage illegally dumped in roadside ditches and along public ways.8'
In an attempt to remedy the problem, the county established, by
ordinance, a sanitation district. The ordinance required all residen-
tial unit owners to subscribe to garbage collection services exclu-
sively controlled by Charlotte County through a franchised dispo-
sal company. Garbage fees were assessed to residential home
owners in the form of a flat rate special assessment and were in-
cluded on the unit owner's property tax bill.85 The county men-
tioned that certain mobile home park associations and seasonal
home owners would prefer to dump their own refuse in the county
82. The cities include Dade City, Eustis, Margate (water and wastewater expansion),
Panama City (exclusive provisions of a marina release agreement for retail fish market, han-
dled by city attorney), Pensacola (airport car rental concession), and Tallahassee (water and
sewer expansion).
83. Bay Harbor Islands, Dade City, Daytona Beach (water and sewer expansion), De-
land, Delray Beach (cable television), Fort Myers, Gainesville (utility services, refusal to
provide to certain develbpments outside the city), North Miami Beach, Palm Bay (relations
with Southern Bell), Palm Beach Gardens (cable television and waste collection), Pensacola,
Surfside, and Valparaiso (all franchises, especially cable).
84. Charlotte County v. Fiske, 350 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
85. This practice is currently authorized by FiA. STAT. § 197.0126(1) (1983).
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landfill and thus avoid the tax. These individuals could claim mo-
nopolization by the county in the business of garbage collection.
The county maintained that its ordinance was designed to protect
the public health, safety, and welfare, as well as to preserve the
aesthetic quality of the environment."6 Recall from question two
that Charlotte County, as of March 1984, had postponed action to
extend its exclusive garbage hauling franchises.
7. Has your city or county attorney's office developed any anti-
trust preventive programs?
This question was designed to assess local governmental at-
tempts to minimize exposure to antitrust liability since Boulder.8 7
Of the 25 counties that responded to the survey, Indian River
County, Jackson County, and St. Lucie County presently maintain
antitrust preventive programs. Escambia, Hillsborough, Lee, Mar-
tin, and Volusia Counties reported other antitrust preventive mea-
sures. Ten of the 125 responding municipalities have existing anti-
trust preventive programs. 8 Ten other cities observed some other
form of preventive measure. 89
8. Would your city or county prefer state legislation to allevi-
ate the antitrust threat to local governments, even at the ex-
pense of home rule?
This question elicited the views of local officials on whether the
86. The Charlotte County garbage ordinance was challenged in Charlotte County v.
Fiske, 350 So. 2d 578. There, the plaintiffs did not allege antitrust violations, but rather,
that the mandatory garbage collection ordinance was unconstitutional. The Second District
reversed the lower court and upheld the county's ordinance, stating that "it certainly cannot
be said that the legislative finding of the distinction between residential units and commer-
cial units based upon recognition of widely varying production of garbage among commer-
cial units is without reason," id. at 580, and that "the entire cost of the services to the
residential units is equally distributed among such units." Id. at 581 (emphasis in original).
It should be noted that to allow the exceptions to the mandatory garbage collection ordi-
nance to residential owners would not only be potentially discriminatory, but would also
undercut the revenue base of the company's existence. This would in turn jeopardize the
county's most effective method of dealing with the garbage problem.
87. See ArTauST AND LocAL GovERNMENT, supra note 7, at 63-66. The question did not
define "antitrust preventive program." Thus, some cities responded that they had a program
which consisted of advice by a city or county attorney on antitrust implications when re-
quired. This is not an "antitrust preventive program."
88. Bay Harbor Islands, Eustis, Gainesville, Longboat Key, Margate, Minneola,
Okeechobee, Orlando, St. Petersburg, and Tallahassee.
89. Cape Canaveral, Clearwater, Cocoa Beach, Daytona Beach, Deerfield Beach, Delray
Beach, Ft. Myers, Okeechobee, Sanibel, and West Palm Beach.
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impact of Boulder was perceived to be great enough to warrant
legislative reform of state antitrust laws. The question did not ask
how this reform might be accomplished, but did leave space for
comments.
Of the 25 counties responding to the survey, 16 favored state leg-
islative action even at the expense of home rule, 5 favored no ac-
tive state involvement in the area which would adversely impact
home rule, 3 abstained, and 1 county maintained that the question
could not be answered in the abstract.
Of the 125 municipalities that responded to the question, 58 fa-
vored some form of state legislative action that would exempt
counties from antitrust liability; 44 favored no active state involve-
ment that would adversely affect home rule; 14 responded other-
wise, and 9 abstained.90 Interestingly, many cities and counties
that favored some form of state legislation which would exempt
local governments from antitrust liability reported few problems
raised by antitrust in relation to other questions in the survey.
C. Survey Analysis
Hundreds of antitrust suits have been filed throughout the coun-
try since Boulder."1 Most of these were filed by private plaintiffs
seeking monetary damages. Four of the 25 counties and 6 of the
125 cities responding to the Florida survey indicated that they
have already retained outside antitrust counsel. Thirteen cities an-
ticipated having to retain outside counsel in the near future.92 The
survey discovered, however, that few local governmental antitrust
cases were actually pending in Florida. While relatively few anti-
trust problems were identified by local government managers and
attorneys, many respondents emphasized a need for some kind of
state legislation to immunize local governments from antitrust
liability.
The principal arguments in favor of local governmental antitrust
liability portray cities as not acting as legislative bodies but as pro-
90. Forty-two percent of 57 city managers who responded to the survey favored some
form of state legislative action, even at the expense of home rule; 44% favored no active
state involvement; 14% gave some other response. Sixty percent of 41 city attorneys re-
sponding to the survey favored some form of state legislative response; 24% favored no
active state involvement; 16% gave some other response. Fifty percent of 27 others respond-
ing to the survey favored some form of state legislative response; 40% favored no active
state involvement; 10% gave some other response.
91. See Brief, supra note 5.
92. See supra note 83.
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prietors when exercising the regulatory powers that adversely im-
pact a commercial enterprise. They urge that cities have gone too
far in regulating the commercial sector.9 3 Today, however, there is
very little that government does that does not affect business or
property.9 "
One argument advanced against local governmental liability is
that cities or counties act in the interest of the private citizen even
though they may regulate the private sector. The maintenance of
order, provision of services, and redistribution of wealth are public
regulatory functions to be exercised by elected officials in their offi-
cial capacities as representatives of the people, and in the interest
of the public health, safety, and welfare. The conflict between pub-
lic regulatory interests and private interests is evident in the area
of cable television.96 Cities often intensively regulate the provision
of cable services and choose to deal with only one or a few cable
companies, or to build their own systems, thereby excluding com-
petitors. Cities argue that their cable ordinances may resemble
contracts because cable is a "natural" monopoly in that (1) the
greater the number of subscribers, the lower the cost; (2) the cable
industry is capital intensive; (3) the assets are fixed in place and
used only for that one function; and (4) duplication of service is
impractical. Consequently, a competitor is dissuaded by market
forces from entering the market place once the first system is es-
tablished. A city must, therefore, anticipate this market character-
isitic by writing an ordinance that guarantees uniform accessibility
of services to the public. In the absence of a fair-access cable ordi-
nance, a cable company is likely to service only the wealthy areas
of town. Moreover, because of the high capital cost of cable televi-
sion systems, a city generally must give a franchise a long-term
contract which will naturally discourage or prevent competition.
Disappointed potential competitors, however, dispute these natural
monopolistic tendencies and claim a right to build systems.96
A second argument advanced against local governmental anti-
trust liability is that "[t]he costs of antitrust liability must be
borne by municipal citizens who, unlike corporate shareholders,
have not voluntarily made an investment in the hope of receiving
93. Goodrich, The Limits of Municipal Power: The cities look on anxiously as their
regulatory powers are challenged under antitrust law, W. CrTy, June 1984, at 18.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 17-18.
96. Id.
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profits. ' e7 A third argument against liability is that municipal anti-
trust suits undermine the political process. Officials may avoid ac-
tions rather than face the threat of an antitrust law suit."" Since
judges may be reluctant to dismiss suits which allege conspiracy or
corruption, a city may undergo years of expensive litigation.
The federal Act functions independently of state antitrust laws.
Florida's local governments, prior to the 1985 Florida amendments,
remained subject to all remedies available under the Florida Anti-
trust Act of 1980. The amendments to the Florida antitrust laws
recognize local governmental regulatory powers, but still retain
penalties for abuse of power. The Florida Legislature achieved a
proper regulatory balance by amending the Florida Antitrust Act
to exempt local governments from damages and injunctions where
the benefit to public health, safety, and welfare from the anticom-
petitive conduct outweighs the detriment to competition. The
Florida legislation did not attempt to distinguish between tradi-
tional local governmental activities and proprietary activities. Each
case is to be evaluated on its facts. The amendments, which at-
tempt to balance public and private interests, should be persuasive
authority in federal court when a local government's compliance
with a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state pol-
icy is questioned.
IV. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST ACT OF 1984
The $9.5 million dollar jury verdict (trebled to $28.5 million dol-
lars) rendered in January 1984, against a Chicago suburb in Unity
Ventures v. County of Lake" provided a major impetus for Con-
gress to seek a solution to the increasing exposure of local govern-
ments to antitrust liability.100 The problem was further exacer-
bated by complaints filed in the spring of 1984 by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) against Minneapolis and New Orleans,
97. Antitrust, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 276 (1982) (footnote
omitted).
98. Goodrich, supra note 93, at 15.
99. Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, No. 81 C-2745, (N.D. Il Jan. 12, 1984) (post-trial
motions are pending in the trial court); see also Unity Ventures, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,883 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (court adopts magistrate's report and recommendations on defen-
dant's motion to dismiss counts alleging violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). The
Village of Grayslake and Lake County had denied the plaintiff access to a new sanitary
sewer system, thereby prohibiting him from developing his farmland.
100. See LEGISLATIVE IISTORY, supra note 4, at 4602,4611. See also Freivogel, The Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 58 FLA. B.J. 51 (1985); Pols, Analysis of Antitrust Legis-
lation, Nation's Cities Weekly, Oct. 22, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
1985] FLORIDA ANTITRUST LAW 101
challenging their regulation of taxicab rates and entry into the
market. In response to complaints by local governments that the
FTC was meddling in local governmental affairs, Congress enacted
legislation banning FTC antitrust actions against cities.101 Shortly
thereafter, this legislation was repealed by section 5 of the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984 in a measure of compromise to
promote the passage of the Act. Nevertheless, the primary provi-
sion of the Act is section 3(a), which eliminates all money damages
under sections 4 (treble damage claims by "persons"), 4A (single
damage claims by the United States), and 4C (treble damage
claims by states) of the Clayton Act brought against a local govern-
ment, official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity, and
in any claim against a person based on any official action directed
by a local government."0 ' The term "local government" is defined
broadly in section 2(1) of the Act to include both special purpose
and general function units of local government.
The Act does not affect antitrust suits brought by private parties
against localities for injunctive relief.0 3 Although injunctive relief
is still available under the Act, if the courts properly administer
101. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-411, § 510, 98 Stat. 1545, repealed by Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, § 5, 98 Stat. 2750, 2751.
102. Sections 1-2 of the Act provide title and definitions; §§ 3-6 are reproduced below:
SEC. 3. (a) No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be
recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c)
from any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official
capacity.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to cases commenced before the effective date
of this Act unless the defendant establishes and the court determines, in light of
all the circumstances, including the stage of litigation and the availability of alter-
native relief under the Clayton Act, that it would be inequitable not to apply this
subsection to a pending case. In consideration of this section, existence of a jury
verdict, district court judgment, or any stage of litigation subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed to be prima facie evidence that subsection (a) shall not apply.
SEC. 4. (a) No damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's fees may be
recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c)
in any claim against a person based on any official action directed by a local gov-
ernment, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to cases commenced before the
effective date of this Act.
SEC. 5. Section 510 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-411), is
repealed.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect thirty days before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
Approved October 24, 1984.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982); see Pols, supra note 100, at 5, cols. 2, 3.
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the bonding provisions of the existing injunctive law, frivolous
claims for injunctive relief against localities will be avoided." 4
Section 4 prohibits damages against private parties (e.g., fran-
chisees, licensees, and permit holders) who take action on the basis
of city regulatory policies or other official policies if those actions
are "directed" by a city or a city official. According to the State-
ment of Managers in the conference report,10 5 the conferees, in re-
ferring to the conduct of parties acting under the direction of a
local government, borrowed the phrase "official action directed by"
a local government directly from Parker v. Brown. e6 The conferees
intended that local governments should be guided by the body of
case law springing from Parker.'0 7 This anti-damages provision is
intended to "ensure that the implementation of city policies will
not be effectively thwarted by [the allowance of] claims for dam-
ages against regulated entities."108e One author has noted that "[i]n
many cases, antitrust claims are brought against these private par-
ties as well as the city."'109 A compelling counterargument to such a
provision is that the protection of regulated entities may lead to
arrangements between commercial enterprises and municipalities
which are intentionally designed to limit or prevent competition.
The final and perhaps the most complex portion of the Act is
section 3(b), which concerns pending cases. Pending cases will not
receive the damage exemption provided by the Act if filed prior to
September 24, 1984 (30 days prior to the date on which President
Reagan signed the bill). Thus, local governments which are defen-
dants in cases commenced prior to that date may yet be liable for
damages provided under the federal antitrust laws. However, sec-
tion 3(b) provides an equitable exception. A court may exempt a
defendant local government from damages in a case filed prior to
September 24, 1984, if the defendant establishes, and the court de-
termines, in light of all the circumstances, including the stage of
litigation and the availability of alternative relief, that it would be
inequitable not to apply the provision which exempts localities
from damages under the antitrust laws. 0
104. Pols, supra note 100, at 5, col. 3.
105. HR. REP. No. 1158, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H11,850 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1984) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
106. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
107. See CONFERENCE REFORT, supra note 105, at H11,850.
108. Id.
109. Pols, supra note 100, at 5, col. 3.
110. The Act does not define the standard "in light of all the circumstances," nor does it
state how this standard is to be applied. As one commentator has noted, "[p]laintiffs will
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Whether the Act will retard post-Boulder litigation remains to
be seen. Certainly the elimination of money damages against local
governments eliminates a major incentive for many federal actions.
Proper administration of bonding provisions with regard to injunc-
tive relief can also be used to ensure that antitrust laws are not
used to bring frivolous claims for injunctive relief against local gov-
ernments. Plaintiffs may, however, seek relief in state courts under
state antitrust statutes that mirror the federal antitrust laws, but
which have not yet incorporated the exemption from damages pro-
vided by the Act.
V. LoCAL GOVERNMENTAL ANTTRUST LLBrYY UNDER THE
FLORIDA ANTrmUST ACT OF 1980
The Florida Antitrust Act of 1980111 resembles the Sherman Act
and provides for civil and criminal penalties, including treble dam-
ages.1"" The Florida Act applies broadly to all persons including
any "governmental entity, including the State of Florida, its de-
partments, agencies, political subdivisions, and units of govern-
ment."1l The Florida Act generally prohibits unreasonable1 4 re-
straints of trade, monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize.2 8 The Florida Act states that "[t]he
legislature declares it to be the purpose of this Act to complement
the body of federal law prohibiting restraints of trade. . ."I' and
provides that "[a]ny activity or conduct exempt under Florida
statutory or common law or exempt from the provisions of the an-
titrust laws of the United States is exempt from the provisions of
argue that the court may consider only the two factors mentioned, stage of litigation and the
adequacy of other relief. Local government defendants will argue that 'all the circumstances'
means more than just the two enumerated." Freivogel, supra note 100, at 52. The Statement
of Managers in the Conference Report, supra note 105, is somewhat instructive. However,
.dialogue exchanged during the floor debate suggests that a court may consider additional
factors, such as (1) the adverse impact a treble damage award might have on a local unit of
government and its citizens; (2) whether the local unit of government acted in good faith
while exercising its normal regulatory, executive, administrative, or judicial powers or pro-
viding traditional public services; and (3) the degree to which the city's action was directed
by, or predicated on, federal law or regulation. See 130 CONG. REC. H12,186-87 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 1984) (colloquy between Congressmen Seiberling and Rodino); 130 CoNG. REc.
S14,565 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dixon).
111. A& STAT. ch. 542 (1983).
112. Id. §§ 542.21-.22.
113. Id. § 542.17(3).
114. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc. v. Outdoor Resorts, Inc., 379 So. 2d 471 (FI. 4th DCA
1980).
115. FIA. STAT. §§ 542.18-.19 (1983).
116. Id. § 542.16.
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this chapter. '117
Despite the statutory references to the incorporation of federal
law, the phrase "any activity or conduct" is distinct from damages;
thus, the damages exemption under the new federal Act is not in-
corporated by the Florida Act. An even more fundamental problem
with the Florida Act is that any argument that the Florida Act
does incorporate the more recent federal Act will itself be subject
to attack under the nondelegation doctrine of the Florida Consti-
tution.11 8 Thus, prior to the 1985 amendments, Florida's localities
still appeared to be subject to full antitrust liability under the
Florida Act.
Not only did the possibility of local governmental antitrust lia-
bility under the Florida Act in state courts remain for actions
brought in state court, it was possible for state antitrust damage
actions to be brought into fdderal courts pendent to federal anti-
trust injunction actions or other federal claims.11' In Dunn v. New
117. Id. § 542.20.
118. See FLA. STAT. ANN. const. art. 3, § 1 (West 1983); Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers,
329 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1976). For an excellent discussion on the nondelegation doctrine as
applied to the Rogers case and with reference to statutes which are similar to FLA. STAT. §
542.20, see Note, Delegation of Power: Judicial Fetters Loosened?, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1043
(1976). The Department of Legal Affairs (DLA) charged Rogers with conducting an unfair
or deceptive trade practice in violation of FLA. STAT. § 501.204. Upon Rogers' request for a
trial on the issues, the circuit court ruled that § 501.204 was unconstitutionally vague and
that § 501.205 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. On direct appeal,
the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the key provisions of Flor-
ida's "little FTC act" are neither vague nor an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. Nevertheless, the supreme court held that § 501.204, which proscribes unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce, and which provides that due consideration and great weight shall be given to
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and federal courts relating to the Federal
Trade Commission Act, is intended only to incorporate Federal Trade Commission and fed-
eral court decisions made prior to the enactment of the "little FTC act." The court stated,
"[t]o preserve the constitutional validity of the act, we would have to say that the legislative
enactment intended only decisions made prior to its enactment." Rogers, 329 So. 2d at 267.
If this principle is applied to FLA. STAT. § 542.20, then the provision that "[a]ny activity or
conduct exempt... from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States is also
exempt from the provisions of this chapter" would appear to incorporate only such law as
was in existence prior to the enactment of ch. 542 in 1980. In addition, § 542.20 does not
even contain the limited standards provided by § 501.205. Thus, § 542.20, and specifically
the language of "activity or conduct," may be susceptible to a vagueness challenge premised
on the argument that there are no standards for or limitations on the delegated power fixed
in the statute.
119. Freivogel, supra note 100, at 53. For an excellent discussion on pendent jurisdic-
tion, see 16 C. WmGrr, A. Mu.LLE, E. COOPER & E. GR ssMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3567, at 106 (1984); 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3937, at 269 (1977). See also Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293, 1306 (S.D.W.
Va. 1982); In re Investors Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 550, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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York State Department of Labor,120 a federal district court held
that "where ... [a] plaintiff couples substantial constitutional
claims with claims that do not involve a constitutional deprivation
[the court] may consider the latter as 'pendent' to the constitu-
tional claims and therefore within [the court's] jurisdiction.' 1 21
Since federal courts are bound to apply state law to a state
claim,122 it was possible for a plaintiff to obtain a federal forum for
an antitrust action that sought damages under state law. For these
reasons, Florida amended its antitrust act to provide immunity to
its localities.
VI THE 1985 AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA ANTITRUST ACT
The Florida legislature recently addressed the matter of local
governmental antitrust immunity. Other states' legislatures that
have not addressed local government antitrust liability may look to
the experiences of both Florida and other states that have already
enacted'2 3 or considered12 4 legislation designed to protect local gov-
ernments from federal antitrust scrutiny12 5 under Boulder. The
language of other state statutes, however, has been drawn to com-
port with a conservative interpretation by state legislators of the
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy stan-
dard announced by the Court in Boulder. The legislation in those
states generally authorizes local governments to displace competi-
tion in specific areas. The most extensive of these statutes was en-
acted in Maryland.' 2 The Maryland statute specifically addressed
concessions and franchises, zoning and land use, transportation,
water and sewage systems, port regulation and construction, solid
waste disposal, and alcoholic beverage regulation. Other states that
have recently considered but not enacted such state legislation in
120. 474 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
121. Id. at 274.
122. Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
123. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-1-10; id. ch. 139, 1 38, § 4-2 (Supp. 1984); L. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 33:4169.1D (West 1985); MID. ANN. CODE art. 29A, § 2A (Supp. 1984); NJ).
CENT. CODE § 40-01-22 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-54-103(d) (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE §3
15.1-23.1, 56-291.3:7 (Supp. 1984).
124. Colo. HB 1254 (1984), SB 211 (1983); N.J. SB 1312 (1984) (pending until Jan.
1986); Miss. HB 1110 (1984); Cal. AB 3695 (1984). The Colorado, Mississippi, and California
bills died.
125. See J. De Raismes, State Antitrust Immunity Laws: 1984 Annual Report of the
Antitrust Committee to the Membership of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
(on file, Florida State University Law Review).
126. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23A, § 2A (Supp. 1984).
1985]
106 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:77
specific areas include California, Mississippi, Colorado, and New
Jersey.12 7 Illinois and North Dakota have passed legislation which
attempts to grant a very broad immunity.2 ' State antitrust legisla-
tion subsequent to enactment of the federal Act will likely feature
a shift in focus from immunization of specific local governmental
activities under Boulder, to limitations on the liabilities of local
governments for antitrust violations under state laws.
The 1985 amendments to the Florida Antitrust Act contain pro-
visions similar to the federal Act.129 The amendments eliminate re-
127. See supra note 124.
128. ILL Rnv. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-1-10; id. ch. 139, 1 38, § 4-2-4 (Supp. 1984); ND. CErr.
CODE § 40-01-22 (1983).
129. Fla. HB 369 (1985) (amending FLA. STAT. § 542.17 (1983); creating FLA& STAT. §
542.235).
Section 1. Subsection (8) is added to section 542.17, Florida Statutes, to read:
542.17 Definitions.-Unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the con-
text, for the purposes of this chapter, the terms defined in this section have the
following meanings ascribed to them:
(8) "Local government" means a municipality, county, school district, or any
other general or special function governmental unit established by the laws of the
state.
Section 2. Section 542.235, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
542.235 Limitations of actions and penalties against local governments and their
officials and employees.-
(1) No criminal action shall be brought pursuant to s. 542.21(2) against any
local government.
(2) No civil penalties, damages, interest on damages, costs or attorneys' fees
shall be recovered under s. 542.21(1) or a. 542.22 from any local government.
(3) No injunctive or other equitable relief pursuant to a. 542.23 shall be granted
against a local government, its officials or employees, acting within the scope of
their lawful authority, if the official conduct which forms the basis of the suit
bears a reasonable relationship to the health, safety, or welfare of the citizens of
the local government unless the court finds that the actual or potential anticompe-
titive effects outweigh the public benefits of the challenged action.
(4) No criminal action shall be maintained pursuant to a. 542.21(2), and no civil
penalties, damages, interest on damages, costs or attorneys' fees shall be recovered
pursuant to s. 542.21(1) or a. 542.22, against any local government official or em-
ployee for official conduct within the scope of their lawful authority, unless the
official or employee has violated the provisions of this chapter for the purpose of
deriving personal financial or professional gain or for the professional or financial
gain of his immediate family or of any principal by whom the official is retained.
Section 3. Sections 542.235(2) and (4), Florida Statutes, shall not apply to cases
commenced before the effective date of this Act unless the defendant establishes
and the court determines, in light of all the circumstances, including the stage of
litigation end the availability of alternative relief, that it would be inequitable not
to apply this subsection to a pending case. In consideration of this section, exis-
tence of a jury verdict, district court judgment, or any stage of litigation subse-
quent thereto, shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that sections 542.235(2)
and (4), Florida Statutes, shall not apply.
Section 4. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
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covery of criminal or civil penalties, including all forms of damages
against any local government or a local official or employee thereof
who acts within the scope of his lawful authority. The amendments
define "local government" as a municipality, county, school dis-
trict, or any other general or special function governmental unit
established under Florida law. This language closely follows the
definition of "local government" set forth in the federal Act. The
amendments also provide for retroactive application of the amend-
ments to pending cases.130 The language is essentially identical to
the pending cases language in the federal Act.3"
The Florida amendments differ from the federal Act in several
respects. The most significant departure from federal law is the
elimination of injunctive relief where the public interest outweighs
the private interest.13 2 This may be especially significant to local
governments in such areas as land use, cable television, and the
construction of central water and sewer systems. For example, in
order to satisfy bonding requirements in public financing of water
and sewer construction, an ordinance that stipulates central solid
waste processing may be necessary.1 33 While such an arrangement
has characteristics of a monopoly, the local government may be as-
sured that it can proceed without fear of a prolonged injunction.
While injunctive relief is permissible under the federal Act, the
Florida amendments may lead to disallowance of injunctive relief
for pendent state antitrust claims in federal court, particularly in
light of the recent Hallie decision. 3 4
Unlike the federal Act, the Florida antitrust amendments do not
provide derivative governmental immunity to private persons
whose actions are directed by a local government. 35 Such a provi-
sion might encourage abuse by private parties who could violate
the antitrust laws with impunity. In the absence of such a provi-
sion, however, local governments may find city policies thwarted if
certain private entities choose not to deal with a locality because of
fear of potential antitrust liability. The intent of the Florida
amendments is, nevertheless, to provide immunity only to local
governments and local officials acting within the bounds of their
lawful authority. Absent acts of bad faith or conflicts of interest,
130. Fla. HB 369 sec. 3 (1985)
131. See supra text accompanying note 110.
132. Fla. HB 369 sec. 2 (1985).
133. See the response of St. Lucie County to survey question no. 2.
134. See supra note 53.
135. Fla. HB 369 (1985).
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conduct by local officials is protected. However, conduct of private
individuals acting under the direction of local governments will not
be protected.
Under the Florida amendments, official misconduct by a local
official, or conduct involving a conflict of interest, is subject to lia-
bility.1 6 The purpose of this provision, perhaps influenced by the
notion of criminal liability under the Sherman Act, is to declare
that under state law, officials who act in bad faith or conspire for
personal gain will remain liable for such unlawful acts. The provi-
sion also appears to codify the holding in Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Larson,137 where the court stated that "there is no authority,
statutory or otherwise, authorizing the insurance commissioners of
Georgia or Florida to conspire with persons to restrain commerce
or exempting them from suit if they do so ... "
Summary
The amendments to Florida's Local Government Antitrust Act
are comprehensive and carefully tailored pieces of legislation. The
amendments will permit greater latitude for legitimate local gov-
ernmental actions to displace competitive activity. State damage
claims pendent to federal injunctive actions also appear to be fore-
closed. In contrast to the federal Act, which leaves intact injunc-
tive relief, the Florida amendments eliminate injunctive relief
under state law in circumstances where public interests outweigh
private interests. The amendments reflect an innovative approach
to state antitrust legislation which balances the interests of local
governments as public institutions against the national policy of
unrestrained competition in commerce.
VIL CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court in Boulder5 9 declared that local gov-
ernments and their officials were subject to both criminal and civil
136. Id. sec. 2.
137. 257 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958). The case involved an action against insurance compa-
nies and the state insurance commissioner to recover treble damages for injuries to the
plaintiffs interstate business by an alleged conspiracy among the defendants. At trial, the
case was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded because the lower court did not consider all of the evidence or support summary
disposition of the case. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that, "official position," by itself, will
not provide those officials with immunity from accountability to the antitrust laws.
138. Id. at 381 (footnote omitted).
139. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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liabilities under the federal antitrust laws, courts had to choose be-
tween accommodating a national policy favoring unrestrained com-
petition, or giving effect to local government policies which, in the
public interest, often displace competition. Before the decision in
Hallie, the Supreme Court's lack of guidance for the application of
the state action exemption doctrine to local governments resulted
in a divergence of opinion among lower federal courts. The concern
that "Boulder 'may have seriously undermined the viability of
home rule in America by withdrawing from home rule municipali-
ties the 'state action' exemption to the Sherman [and Clayton] An-
titrust Act[s]' "140 not only accounted for the willingness among
some federal courts to liberally construe the "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed" state action exemption,""" but ulti-
mately prompted the Supreme Court in Hallie to revisit the state
action exemption doctrine.
The new federal Act alleviates civil monetary damage liability of
local governments for antitrust violations. The Hallie decision fur-
ther specifies what type of state legislation is necessary to exempt
local governments from antitrust liability under federal law. States
that wish to avoid local governmental antitrust liability under state
law must amend their antitrust statutes. Since Florida's antitrust
statute tracks the language of the federal antitrust provisions and
allows treble damages, the Florida legislature decided there was a
special need to amend the Florida Act at least to the extent of
eliminating money damage liability. The Florida amendments ac-
complish this by eliminating all monetary damages and, under cer-
tain circumstances, injunctive relief.
In considering the appropriateness of Florida's antitrust amend-
ments, one might find it useful to review the three types of reme-
dial approaches considered by the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate:
(1) elimination of private [suits] by restricting antitrust actions
against municipalities and their officials to those brought by the
federal antitrust agencies or by State attorneys general; (2) re-
stricting private damage relief against municipalities and their of-
140. Freilich, Donovan & Rawls, supra note 7, at 718 (quoting Freilich & Carlisle, The
Community Communications Case: A Return to the Dark Ages Before Home Rule, 14 UR.
LAw. v, v (Spring 1982)). See also Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City,
705 F.2d 1005, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1983) (court stated that requiring active state supervision
"could erode the local autonomy that the state has sought to encourage"), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1864 (1985).
141. See LaaIsTivE HimS y, supra note 4, at 4608.
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ficials to actual damages; (3) restricting private relief against mu-
nicipalities and their officials to injunctive relief.142
The first approach was rejected by Congress because there were
no assurances that the potential anticompetitive actions of local
governments and their officials were always in the public interest.
In addition, the role of the "private attorneys general" remains
central to the scheme of antitrust enforcement.' 43 The second ap-
proach, while limiting the potential for exorbitant damages which
the trebling provision of the federal antitrust laws has created,
does not entirely eliminate the damage liability of localities. Such
damages remained a concern of all local governments, especially
smaller units of government. Thus, Congress favored the third op-
tion, the restriction of private remedies to injunctive relief. 44
The Florida amendments, while constructed along the lines of
the third option in regard to the elimination of damages, go even
farther to protect local governments by eliminating injunctive re-
lief. This provision, however, is not absolute. Private injunctive re-
lief is permitted in situations where the public health, safety, and
welfare are not justifiably served. In this manner, the interests of
the local government and the private or commercial entity are bal-
anced. This balancing of interests has permitted the Florida legis-
lature to follow the policies behind the federal Act and the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Hallie. Other states having
statutes that track the federal antitrust laws and provide for local
government antitrust liability should consider the Florida amend-
ments and the need to protect local governments from antitrust
challenges under state law without undue interference with fair
competition.
142. Id. at 4619.
143. Id.
144. Id.
